Recently, researchers have started to re-examine the so-called Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem on optimal commodity taxation. The essence of such research is to examine whether or not it is optimal to distort markets other than the labor market for achieving the second-best resource allocation. I examine this theorem by introducing the comparative advantage of human capital accumulation. More specifically, I assume that people with high ability obtain a higher return from skilled human capital accumulation than people with low ability. I explore the implication of this comparative advantage of human capital accumulation for the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem on optimal commodity taxation.
Introduction
The manner by which income should be redistributed among different individuals is one of the fundamental questions in public finance. For example, in the United States, income is redistributed not only through the income tax system, but also through various other policies, such as subsides for housing and medical services. These policies certainly change the relative prices of such goods and thus introduce additional distortion in the economy. It might be argued that instead of introducing additional distortion in the market for such consumption goods, the government should use only income tax for the purpose of income redistribution from the point of efficiency. By applying the framework developed by Mirrlees (1970) , Stiglitz (1976, 1980) analyzed this issue in a situation in which the government can use a commodity tax/subsidy as well as a non-linear income tax for redistribution. They showed that if leisure and consumption goods are weakly separable in the utility function and if the government can use a non-linear income tax system, then the non-linear income tax system is sufficient for the second-best Pareto-efficient allocation, and commodity taxes and subsidies are not necessary as policy instruments. The basic intuition of this important result can be explained as follows. When the government can use a non-linear income tax system, the firstorder distortion that the social planner needs to consider is over-consumption of leisure. Thus, the social planner can Pareto-improve welfare if he can relax the over-consumption of leisure by introducing another distortion in the consumption goods market. However, under the assumption of weak separability, all consumption goods have the same complementarity/substitutability with leisure. Thus, it is harmful to introduce another distortion on choice of consumption goods.
This result, the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem, has several implications. First, the theorem can act as a guide for evaluating redistributive policy that introduces distortion in the consumption goods market. For example, if we admit that housing and medical services are weakly separable from leisure, then the theorem states that such goods should not be subsidized for the purpose of redistribution. Second, it tells researchers on what type of empirical parameters to focus for evaluation of the redistributive policies. The theorem indicates that complementarity/substitutability with leisure is the key parameter for evaluating distortionary policies.
Given the importance of the result and the logic of the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem, it is not surprising that many researchers have looked for cases in which the theorem fails to hold. For example, Cremer, Pestieau and Rochet (2001) showed that the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem does not hold true when individuals differ in ability and endowment; and Saez (2002) showed that the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem does not hold true when tastes are heterogeneous.
In the Mirrlees and Atkinson-Stiglitz models, it is assumed that the wage rates of workers are exogenously fixed. This is due to the implicit assumption that labor provided by high-wage workers and low-wage workers are prefect substitutes and that the difference in wages simply reflects the difference in productivity of these workers. With a redistributive income tax system under asymmetric information on individual wage rates, high-wage workers have an incentive to supply less labor and to mimic low-wage workers by earning less. This disincentive effect is measured as the labor supply of high-wage workers mimicking low-wage workers. Let the wage rate of high-and low-wage workers be w s and w u , respectively. Let the labor supply of high-and low-wage workers at equilibrium be l s and l u . Then the disincentive effect is denoted as w u l u /w s . Note that as long as high-wage workers earn more than low-wage workers at equilibrium (which must be true due to incentive compatibility constraints and a single crossing property),
Equation (1) means that if high-wage workers mimic low-wage workers, then a high-wage worker can reduce his labor supply and might be able to increase his utility. Thus, at equilibrium the consumption of high-wage workers must be high enough so that they have no incentive to mimic low-wage workers. This constraint restricts the government intention to redistribute income from high-to low-wage workers and determines the shape of a non-linear income tax schedule.
The perfect substitutability assumption of labor supplied by different types of workers in the Atkinson-Stiglitz model implies that the relative wage, w s /w u , is constant and is not affected by market conditions. Naito (1999) questioned these assumptions, arguing that when two types of labor are imperfect substitutes in production, a commodity tax on skilled-labor-intensive goods can increase efficiency because it will reduce the difference in wage rates between high-and low-wage workers. To illustrate this point, consider the standard Harberger model that is used in the public finance literature, assuming that the two factors are skilled labor and unskilled labor. Also assume that the two types of goods are skilled-labor-intensive goods (e.g., computer software, medicines and financial services) and unskilledintensive goods (e.g., food products and textiles). The government is interested in redistributing income from skilled to unskilled workers, but is subject to information constraint in the sense that it cannot observe and verify individual wages. (If it can observe and verify individual wages, the issue of income redistribution becomes trivial, since it can use lump-sum transfers contingent on individual wages.) However, even if individual wages are not observable, the government can affect the aggregate level of the relative wage for skilled and unskilled labor. If the government imposes a commodity tax on skilled-labor-intensive goods, then, as analysis by the Harberger model shows, the relative demand for goods will shift toward unskilled-labor-intensive goods. Such a shift in demand for goods increases the demand for unskilled labor and decreases that for skilled labor. Consequently, in order for the labor market to be in equilibrium, the wage rate for skilled labor decreases and that for unskilled labor increases. Thus, the difference in wage rate between skilled and unskilled labor becomes small. When the wage differential becomes small, the righthand side(RHS) of (1) increases. This implies that high-wage workers have less incentive to mimic low-wage workers, and, thus, the government can design a non-linear income tax system more efficiently. Because distortion in a goods market introduced by a commodity tax is of the second order, introduction of a commodity tax can improve efficiency.
The result of Naito (1999) has important implications not only for the use of commodity taxes/subsidies, but also for other public policies. The Naito result shows that many policies can potentially be used to improve the efficiency of income redistribution by affecting labor market conditions and eventually changing relative wages. For example, Naito (1999) explored the implication for employment policy on public production (e.g., jobs at the post office) and showed that to achieve efficient redistribution, the government should employ relatively more unskilled and less skilled labor for public production than the level calculated using a cost-minimizing condition; such an employment policy tightens the market for unskilled labor and loosens it for skilled labor, resulting in an increase in the relative wage for unskilled over skilled labor.
Recently, however, Saez (2004) re-examined this issue and argued that the result of Naito (1999) does not hold in the long run when human capital accumulation is endogenous and, as a result, choice of occupation (skilled or unskilled) is endogenous. He argued that in Naito's model, the intrinsic parameter to distinguish different types of workers is the wage rate. Although the government cannot observe the individual wage rate, it can change the wage rate of the economy by changing the demand for labor. This is why the government can increase efficiency. However, when human capital is endogenous, the intrinsic parameter to distinguish different types of workers is ability. Since ability is not affected by market conditions, Saez argued that changing the wage rate, i.e., increasing the wage rate for skilled labor and decreasing that for unskilled labor, does not increase efficiency.
Given the significance of human capital accumulation for economic performance, the contribution of Saez is of consequence and it is worth noting the key assumption.
In the Saez model, when workers of different ability and level of different level of human capital obtain the same job, the same job earns the same income. This assumption implies that heterogeneous abilities are reflected in the different disutility of the accumulation process for human capital, but it does not generate a differ-ent income when two individuals with different abilities have the same job. This essentially assumes that human capital accumulation activities by two different individuals with different abilities are perfect substitutes. Under this assumption, a change in the wage rate for a high-paying job and low-paying job affects both high-and low-ability individuals equally. Thus, in essence, Saez introduces the perfect substitutability of inputs ( process of human capital accumulation by highand low-ability individuals) again, as in the original Mirrlees (1970) and AtkinsonStiglitz(1976 AtkinsonStiglitz( ,1980 model. 1 In reality, different people have different comparative advantages in accumulating different types of human capital. Thus, the existence of a comparative advantage introduces non-substitutability for innate ability. This paper demonstrates that in the presence of comparative advantage, the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem does not hold true, even if human capital accumulation is endogenous.
To illustrate the basic idea, consider a situation in which people with greater ability have a comparative advantage in accumulating skilled human capital and people with less ability have a comparative advantage in accumulating unskilled human capital. Furthermore, assume that the government cannot monitor individual accumulated human capital and can only observe income levels. For example, when an individual's income is high, there are two possible explanations: the individual has high ability with low level of human capital; or low ability with high level of human capital. However, the government does not know which case applies to this individual. In this situation, if a low-ability worker obtains more benefit than a high-ability worker from an increase (decrease) in the return from unskilled (skilled) human capital accumulation, then the logic of Naito (1999) suggests that a commodity tax can increase efficiency.
At this point, the reader might wonder about the difference between the current paper and Naito (1999 Naito ( , 2004 . First, in contrast to Naito (1999) , this paper assumes the presence of comparative advantage and the endogeneity of skill choice. However, note that the presence of comparative advantage does not necessarily mean that high-ability (low-ability) individuals always accumulate skilled (unskilled) human capital. In the current analysis, I assume that it is still possible for a highability individual to accumulate unskilled human capital. On the other hand, in the imperfect substitutable labor model (Naito, 1999) , it is assumed that skilled (unskilled) individuals supply only skilled (unskilled) labor. Thus, the inference from the analysis of Naito (1999) is not obvious. The intuition suggests that if two types of individuals with different abilities are very similar, introduction of a commodity tax does not increase efficiency because a change in wages affects the two types of workers similarly. This suggests that the way in which two individuals differ is the key parameter in determining the efficiency of commodity taxation. In fact, as shown below, Eq. (3), which measures how two individuals are different, is the key condition for the efficiency of commodity taxation. If (3) does not hold, my result does not always hold. Second, in contrast to Naito (2004) , this paper assumes that the economy is a closed economy. Naito (2004) assumed that the economy was a small open economy, since the interest was in commercial policy. In a standard open-economy model without a non-tradable goods sector, a commodity tax cannot affect factor prices due to forces explained in the well-known factor price equalization theorem (Samuelson, 1949) . Therefore, the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem is valid and commodity tax is redundant in the presence of non-linear income tax. In contrast, in a closed economy, a commodity tax can affect the factor prices. When goods prices and factor prices are endogenous, the analysis becomes more complex and it is possible that the intuition in an open economy model does not follow that in a closed economy. This is why I analyze the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem in a closed economy. 2 The crucial assumption in this paper is the presence of comparative advantage in human capital accumulation. Although several empirical papers have examined the relationship between return to schooling and ability, in this paper I simply postulate the existence of comparative advantage as an untested hypothesis and appeal to the reader's intuition to justify this. 3 The organization of this paper is as follows. In the following sub-section I prove the main result by assuming that two types of human capital are perfect substitutes in the utility function.
Analysis

The Basic Model
I assume that there are two types of human capital in the economy: skilled human capital and unskilled human capital. I assume that the utility cost of accumulation of these two types of human capital are perfect substitutes in the utility function. 4 The economy is a closed economy in which there are two output goods: good 1 and good 2. Good 1 is skilled human capital intensive goods and good 2 is unskilled human capital intensive goods. This implies that people accumulate only one type of human capital and that individual behavior includes a discrete choice. Besides the reason mentioned in the previous section, conducting welfare analysis when individual behavior includes a discrete choice is also useful from a theoretical standpoint. In many important economic situations, such as choosing where to live, choosing of technology by firms and deciding on labor market participation, decisions made by consumers or firms include discrete choices. Until very recently, welfare analysis that included discrete choices was rare. To the best of my knowledge, only Boadway and Cuff (2001) have started to investigate this issue. They analyzed the optimal taxation problem when some individuals are bunched at the bottom.
Regarding individuals, there is a continuum of agents and all agents have identical, additive separable utility functions with respect to consumption, skilled human capital investment and unskilled human capital investment. All the abilities of individuals are indexed by i, where i takes any value from 1 to 2. I assume that the utility function of agent of type i has the following form:
where u(c 1i ,c 2i ) is strictly increasing with each argument and strictly concave. For normalization, I assume that a s = a u = 1. Note that this utility function is weakly separable and thus satisfies the condition of Stiglitz (1976, 1980) . I assume that the sub-utility function u(c 1i ,c 2i ) is homothetic. This implies that the demand function does not depend on income distribution in this economy. This assumption simplifies the analysis substantially. The labor supply is fixed and is normalized to 1. The indices h s i and h u i are the levels of skilled and unskilled human capital of individual i and can be interpreted as levels of knowledge, years of education, and experience and training for each type of skill. Let g si and g ui be ability indices for skilled and unskilled human capital for an individual i. Let w s and w u be the returns from one efficient unit of skilled and unskilled human capital. Given the amount of skilled and unskilled human capital for individual i, I assume that the earnings of individual i are determined as:
Equation (2) means that when individual i accumulates h s i units of skilled human capital and h u i units of unskilled human capital, the efficient units of skilled and unskilled human capital are g si × h s i and g ui × h u i and total earnings from skilled and unskilled human capital are g si × w s × h s i and g ui × w u × h s i , respectively. To simplify the notation, let g si × w s and g ui × w u be w s i and w u i , respectively. Denote dg ji /di as g ji , where j = s, u. g si /g si and g ui /g ui measure the absolute advantage of an agent with ability i + ε over agent i in accumulating skilled and unskilled human capital, respectively. We assume that agents with greater ability have absolute advantage in accumulating both skilled and unskilled human capital: g si /g si > 0 and g ui /g ui > 0. 5 Also, as discussed in the Introduction, I assume that agents who have greater ability have a comparative advantage in accumulating skilled over unskilled human capital. Thus, I assume that:
The economic meaning of the above equation is that with increasing ability, the relative return from accumulating skilled human capital increases compared to that of unskilled human capital.
As for the objective of the government, the social planner maximizes the following utilitarian social welfare function:
As for prices, the producer price and consumer price of good 2 are normalized to 1. Let p 1 and t be the producer price of good 1 and the specific tax on good 1. Then the consumer price of good 1 is p 1 + t.
On the production side, I assume the standard Harberger model. In this economy, there are two sectors. Sector 1 is the skilled human capital intensive sector and produces a good 1. Sector 2 is the unskilled human capital intensive sector and produces a good 2. Each sector uses both skilled and unskilled human capital. Consumers (workers) are perfectly mobile between the two sectors. When an agent who has h s i units of skilled human capital and h u i units of unskilled human capital works in sector k = 1, 2, this means that sector k uses g si × h s i units of skilled human capital and g ui × h u i units of unskilled human capital. Each sector behaves as a price taker and maximizes its profits. Let F k (H s k , H u k ) be the production function in sector k = 1, 2 where H s k and H u k are the total amount of skilled and unskilled human capital used in sector k. We assume that F k (H s k , H u k ) exhibits constant returns to scale 5 The assumption of an absolute advantage is not necessary, but is a sufficient condition that guarantees that agents who have higher i will receive higher utility. As long as agents with higher ability can receive higher utility, the assumption of an absolute advantage is not necessary. and is concave with respect to both arguments. Let c k (w s ,w u ) be the cost function to produce one unit of output in sector k when the returns for one efficient unit of skilled and unskilled human capital are w s and w u , respectively. When both good 1 and good 2 are produced at equilibrium, w s and w u are determined as follows:
From the Stolper and Samuelson (1941) theorem, ∂w s /∂ p 1 > 0 and ∂w u /∂ p 1 < 0.
The output of both types of goods is determined from the following factor market equilibrium conditions: 
where
H s and H u are the total skilled and unskilled human capital in this economy. Although the outputs of both types of goods can be calculated from Eq. (6), it is more useful to work on the production possibility frontier for analytical reasons. For given H s and H u and p, the optimal output of each goods is determined from the production possibility frontier. Using the technique applied in Naito (1999), we can write Y k (p 1 ,H u ,H u ) as the output function of goods k. At the optimum, the slope of the production possibility set is equal to the relative producer price of good 1. Thus, we obtain
The prices in this economy are determined so that the outputs of good 1 and good 2 are equated to the demand for good 1 and good 2, respectively. On the other hand, to find the equilibrium price, it is easy to focus on the relative demand, since the utility function is homothetic and the relative demand is independent of income level. Let RD(p 1 + t) be the relative demand of good 1. Because of the homotheticity of the utility function, it is independent of income level and RD p ≡ dRD/dp 1 < 0. Let RS(p 1, H s ,H u ) be the relative supply of good 1. From the shape of the production possibility frontier and the Rybczynski theorem, we have RS p ≡ ∂RS/∂(p 1 +t) > 0, RS H s≡∂RS/∂H s > 0, RS H u ≡∂RS/∂H u < 0. The equilibrium price is determined from the following equation:
From the above equation, the equilibrium price can be a function of t, H s and H u . Thus, we can write the price of good 1 as p 1 = p 1 (t,H s ,H u ). Once the price of good 1 is determined, then the returns from skilled and unskilled human capital are determined by (5).
When two types of skill accumulation are perfect substitutes in the disutility function, the agent always solves the following constrained disutility minimization problem:
where w s i = g si × w s ;w u i = g ui × w u and R is pre-tax income.
In the above problem, an agent with ability i accumulates only skilled human capital if 1 < w s i /w u i and accumulates only unskilled human capital 1 > w s i /w u i . Note that because of the assumption of comparative advantage (3), w s i /w u i is an increasing function of i. Let i * be i that satisfies (w s × g si )/(w u × g ui ) = 1. Then, agents whose ability is greater than i * accumulate only skilled human capital and agents whose ability i is less than i * accumulate only unskilled human capital. We assume that such an i * is located between 1 and 2. 6 Given such i * , Z(w s i , w u i , R) is:
Let X(R) be an after-tax income schedule that the government designs. Then each agent chooses his best R to maximize U(p 2 , X(R)) − Z(w s i , w u i , R). Once R is chosen, an agent chooses his optimal skill type and accumulates human capital to generate pre-tax income R. Let v(i) be the maximized value given schedule X(R):
where U(p 1 + t, X) is the indirect utility function when the price of good 1 is p 1 + t and income is X. For analysis of the optimal schedule of X(R), we assume that the schedule of X(R) is a continuous function. Although it is possible that the optimal schedule of X(R) is not continuous, the tax schedules of almost all of the developed countries are continuous. When X(R) is a continuous function, it is straightforward to show that v(i) is continuous with respect to i from the theory of the maximum (Berge, 1963) . In addition, there is an interesting property in v(i) in the neighborhood of i * that is crucial for my result. The graph of v(i) has the shape shown in Figure 1 . The following lemma shows that property of v(i).
Lemma 1 When i increases, the graph of v(i) has a counter-clockwise kink at i * .
Proof. The proof is in Naito (2004) .
The intuition of the above Lemma is that the value function is convex with respect to a parameter when agents change control variables as the parameter changes. Thus, the above Lemma comes from the optimization behavior of agents. Now consider the problem of designing a non-linear income tax system. Let (R j ,X j ) be the pre-tax income and after-tax income when an agent announces that his type is j. Then define v(i) and v( j;i) as follows:
v(i) is the maximized utility of agent i given the schedule (R j ,X j ) and v( j;i) is the indirect utility when agent i announces that he is type j. The global incentive compatibility condition implies that the type i agent has an incentive to announce that he is type i: i = arg max { j} v( j;i).
Assuming the differentiability of (X j ,R j ), the first-order condition of the incentive compatibility condition is:
On the other hand, using the definition Z(w s i ,w u i ,R j ), we can calculate dv(i)/di for i in (1,i * ) and (i * ,2).
Next, we check the single crossing property of the utility function U(p 1 +t, X)− Z(R, w s , w u , R). The marginal rate of substitution between X and R is:
Thus, MRS(R,X) is a decreasing function of i and the single crossing property is satisfied. This means that the local incentive compatibility constraint (8) and (9) and the monotone condition of R are sufficient conditions for global incentive compatibility (7) (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1992) . Through the analysis in this paper, we assume that the monotonicity constraint is not binding. 7 Given the first-order conditions of the incentive compatibility constraint, it is useful to suppose that the government controls v(i) and R i and that X i is defined from the following relationship:
Let x(R, v, p 1 +t, w s i , w u i ) be the solution that solves (10) for X. Obviously,
Finally, for analytical convenience, we rewrite the first-order condition of (8) and (9) 
Based on this set-up, the aim of the government is to solve the following programming problem:
The above programming problem deserves several comments. First, (IC1) and (IC2) are the local incentive compatibility constraints. Second, (BD1) comes from the assumption that the tax schedule that the government designs is continuous and, as a result, the utility level of agents must also be continuous. (BD2) comes from the assumption that individual i * chooses only one R. Now let µ s i , µ u i and λ be the Lagrangian multipliers of (IC1), (IC2) and (RC). Let β 1 , β 2 , β s and β u be the Lagrangian multipliers of (BD1), (BD2), (SHC) and (UHC). The first-order conditions can be calculated and these are presented in the Appendix to save space. Then, we need to know the effect of increasing t from zero on social welfare, which is equivalent to dW /dt. Using the envelope theorem, we have (see the Appendix, which is available on the Journal's website):
ability is in (i * ,i * + (di * /dp 1 )(dp 1 /dt)) will switch from accumulating skilled to unskilled human capital. Since the graph of v(i) has a counter-clockwise kink at i * , individuals in (i * ,i * +(di * /dp 1 )(dp 1 /dt)) experience a first-order decrease in˙v. This implies that the government needs less ability-sensitive compensation schedules for these agents. Because this change in˙v has a first-order effect, it increases social welfare. Eq. (11) can be interpreted in terms of the marginal tax schedule as well. Note that (∂Z/∂R m )/U x is equal to 1 − T m i , where T m i is the marginal tax rate of income for those who accumulate type m = s,u skill and whose ability is equal to i. From the FOC of R s i and R u i ,
Thus, since (∂h/∂R) × R = h, we have:
T s i * and T u i * are the marginal tax rates of individuals just above and just below i * , respectively. When t increases in a compensated way, the price of good 1 increases by Ψ 1 , taking the effect of the change in human capital into consideration. When the price of good 1 increases, i * changes by di * /∂ p 1 . Then an individual just above i * , who initially accumulated skilled human capital, will switch from accumulating skilled to unskilled human capital. Since the marginal tax rate for those who accumulated skilled human capital is higher than that for those who accumulated unskilled human capital around i * , the marginal tax rate will decrease. 9 Thus, R s i * T s i * − R u i * T u i * is the earnings affected by a change in the marginal tax rates. Since this change in the marginal tax rate is of the first order, it can increase social welfare.
A Case of Imperfect Substitutes
In the previous sub-section, I considered a case in which two types of human capital accumulation are perfect substitutes in the disutility function. Although the notion that an individual will accumulate only one type of human capital is intuitive, it is still important to check whether Proposition 1 holds when the two types of human capital accumulations are imperfect substitutes. Note that when two types of human capital accumulation are imperfect substitutes, the comparative advantage condition must be changed, since the marginal disutility of human capital accumulation is not constant. Other than that, the basic intuition of Section 2.1 follows when two types of human capital accumulation are imperfect substitutes. 10 
Conclusion
In this paper, I have examined whether using a commodity tax can increase social welfare in the presence of a non-linear income tax system when human capital accumulation is endogenous. For this purpose I developed a model in which individuals can choose the amount of both skilled and unskilled human capital based on their comparative advantage. Assuming that individuals with greater ability have comparative advantage in accumulating skilled human capital, I have shown that indirect redistribution such as imposition of a commodity tax on skilled human capital-intensive goods can increase the efficiency of, and complement, an income tax system. This suggests that the validity of the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem depends on how the process of human capital accumulation is modeled. The results of this paper also suggest that empirical studies examining whether the returns from human capital are different among individuals with different abilities have important implications for public policy. For example, if the return on college education is greater for people with greater ability, subsidies for college education can have a negative effect on social welfare. 
